INTRODUCTION
With the enormous growth of network-based computer services and the huge increase in the number of applications running on networked systems, the adoption of appropriate security measures to protect against computer and network intrusions is a crucial issue in a computing environment. Intrusions into or attacks on a computer or network system are activities or attempts to destabilize it by compromising security in confidentiality, availability or integrity of the system. As defined in [1] , an intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors events occurring in a computer system or a network and analyzes them for signs of intrusions. A network-based IDS (NIDS) often consists of a set of single-purpose sensors or host computers placed at various points in a network. These units monitor network traffic, performing local analysis of that traffic and reporting attacks to a central management console.
Network-based intrusion detection is generally implemented using two approaches [2] : rule-based and anomaly-based. Rulebased (also called misuse-based) detection searches for specific patterns (or intrusion signatures given in terms of rules) in the data to effectively detect previously known intrusions. Snort [3] is a widely used rule-based NIDS that can detect intrusions based on previously known intrusion signature patterns.
The rule-based approach usually does not generate a large number of false alarms since it is based on rules that identify known intrusions but it fails to detect new types of intrusions as their signatures are not known. Anomaly detection consists of analyzing and reporting unusual behavioral patterns in computing systems. The anomaly-based detection approach typically builds a model of normal system behavior from the observed data and distinguishes any significant deviations or exceptions from this model. Anomaly-based detection implicitly assumes that any deviation from normal behavior is anomalous. The anomaly detection approach has the ability to examine new or unknown intrusions.
Based on the machine learning method used, anomaly detection can be classified into two different categories [4] : supervised and unsupervised. In supervised anomaly detection, 2 P. Gogoi et al. the normal behavior model of systems or networks is established by training with a labeled or purely normal dataset. These normal behavior models are used to classify new network connections. The system generates an alert if a connection is classified to be malign or abnormal behavior. In practice, to train a supervised anomaly-based approach, labeled or purely normal data are not easily available. It is time-consuming to acquire and error-prone to manually classify and label a large number of data instances as benign or malign.
Unsupervised anomaly detection approaches work without any training data or these models may be trained on unlabeled or unclassified data and they attempt to find intrusions lurking inside the data. The most prevalent advantage of the anomaly detection approach is the detection of unknown intrusions without any previous knowledge. However, the false detection rate tends to be higher if the behavior of some of the intrusions is not significantly different from the considered normal behavior model.
Two types of unsupervised approaches have been used to detect network anomalies: clustering and outlier-based.
Clustering is a method of grouping objects based on the similarity among them. The similarity within a cluster is high and the dissimilarity among distinct clusters is high as well. Clustering is a unsupervised method of analysis carried out on unlabeled data [5] . It results in inclusion of similar data in the same class and dissimilar data in different classes. Unsupervised anomaly-based detection usually clusters [6] the test dataset into groups of similar instances, some of which may be intrusion and others normal data. The stability of these clusters and how to label them are difficult issues. To label clusters, an unsupervised anomaly-based detection approach models normal behavior by using two assumptions [4] : (i) the number of normal instances vastly outnumbers the number of anomalies and (ii) anomalies themselves are qualitatively different from normal instances. If these assumptions hold, intrusions can be detected based on cluster size. Larger clusters correspond to normal data, and smaller clusters correspond to intrusions. But this method is likely to produce a high false detection rate as the assumptions are not always true in practice. For example, in the denial of service (DoS) category of intrusions, a large number of very similar instances are generated resulting in larger clusters than clusters corresponding to normal behavior. On the other hand, in remote to local (R2L) and user to root (U2R) categories of intrusions, legitimate and illegitimate users are difficult to distinguish and their numbers of occurrences may not be significantly different. These intrusions (U2R and R2L) may be included in normal behavior model. Consequently, these can raise the false detection rate.
The second unsupervised approach that is popular in network intrusion detection is outlier-based. Outliers refer to data points that are very different from the rest of the data based on appropriate measures. Such data points often contain useful information regarding unusual behavior of a system described by the data. These anomalous data points are usually called outliers. Outlier detection is widely used in the finding of anomalous activity in telecommunication, credit card fraud detection, detection of symptoms of new diseases and novel network attack detection. The major challenge for outlier detection in intrusion detection is to handle the huge volume of mixed-type, i.e. numerical and categorical, data. So, outlier detection schemes need to be computationally efficient in handling these large-sized inputs. An outlier can be an observation that is distinctly different or is at a position of abnormal distance from other values in the dataset. Detection of abnormal behavior can be based on relevant features extracted from network traces, packet or flow data. An intrusion can be detected by finding an outlier whose features are distinctly different from the rest of the data. Outliers can often be individuals or groups of objects exhibiting behavior outside the range of what is considered normal. A review of anomaly identification using outlier detection is available in [7] .
In network-based intrusion detection, the threat may arise from new or previously unknown intrusions. The preferred detection approach for novel intrusions is anomaly-based instead of rule-based. In supervised anomaly-based detection, obtaining labeled or purely normal data is a critical issue. Unsupervised anomaly-based detection can address this issue of novel intrusion detection without prior knowledge of intrusions or purely normal data. In practice, it may be better to use a combination of supervised and unsupervised learning to achieve the best performance that current techniques allow.
Motivation
The motivation behind the design of the IDS we discuss in this paper is to develop an IDS that has a high effective overall performance for known as well as unknown attacks. The detection accuracy of a classifier is usually not equally good for each class (see Table 2 a little later in the paper). Experimental studies can be used to determine the effectiveness of a classifier in terms of its performance with known attacks so as to build an effective combination classifier to attain good overall performance with all classes of known as well as unknown attacks.
Contribution
Some of the salient contributions of the work described in this paper are given below.
(i) An enhanced supervised classifier based on a categorical clustering algorithm [8] .
(ii) An unsupervised classifier based on the k-point clustering algorithm [9] with cluster stability analysis and labeling. 
Category Description

DoS
In DoS, an attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service, viz., SYN flood, neptune and teardrop
DDoS
In distributed DoS (DDoS), an attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service by sending packets to a network amplifier or a system supporting broadcast addressing, with the return address spoofed to the victim's IP address, viz., smurf and fraggle
R2L
In R2L, attackers try to gain access to a victim machine without having an account on it, viz., password guessing U 2R In U 2R, an attacker has local access to the victim machine and tries to gain super user privilege, viz., buffer overflow Probe
In Probe, an attacker tries to gain information about the target host, viz., port-scan and ping-sweep (iv) A hybrid multi-level classifier based on supervised, unsupervised and outlier detection algorithms, with superior performance over all classes.
Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in supervised, unsupervised, outlier-based and multi-level hybrid intrusion detection methods. In Section 3, we provide an overview of our approach, including a clear formation of the problem (Section 3.1), and the overall architecture of our approach (Section 3.2). Details of the approach are given in Sections 4-6. Section 4 discusses the supervised classifier we use, Section 5 the unsupervised classifier and Section 6 our outlier-based approach. These three approaches work together to achieve the best results possible. Theoretical analysis of the multi-level hybrid system is given in Section 7.
Experimental results for knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD) 1999 datasets, NSL-KDD datasets and Tezpur University intrusion detection system (TUIDS) intrusion datasets are reported in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Network attacks include four main categories: DoS (single source as well as distributed source), Probe, U2R and R2L, following the standard classification of network intrusions as given in [10] . The categories of attacks is given in Table 1 . Several well-cited supervised anomaly detection methods [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] exist in the literature. Audit data analysis and mining (ADAM) [11] is a supervised anomaly-based as well as misuse-based NIDS. ADAM uses a classifier which has been previously trained to classify the suspicious connections as a known type of attack, an unknown type or a false alarm. The method is composed of three modules: a preprocessing engine, a mining engine and a classification engine. The preprocessing engine sniffs out transport control protocol/internet protocol traffic data, and extracts information from the header of each connection according to a predefined schema. The mining engine applies mining association rules to the connection records. It works on two modes: training mode and detecting mode.
Burbeck and Nadjm-Tehrani [12] propose a clusteringbased anomaly detection approach anomaly detection With fast incremental clustering (ADWICE) using an extended BIRCH [19] clustering algorithm to implement a fast, scalable and adaptive anomaly detection scheme. They apply clustering as a technique for training of the normality model.
A number of IDSes employ the unsupervised anomaly-based approach [20, 21] . Kingsly et al. [20] present an unsupervised anomaly detection method for network intrusion detection. The method uses density and grid-based [22] approach, based on a subspace clustering algorithm pMAFIA [23] . Grid-based methods divide the object space into a finite number of cells that form a grid structure. All of the clustering operations are performed on the grid structure.
Casas et al. [21] introduce an unsupervised network anomaly detection algorithm (UNADA) for knowledge-independent detection of anomalous traffic. UNADA uses a novel clustering method based on sub-space-density clustering to identify clusters and outliers in multiple low-dimensional spaces. The evidence of traffic structure provided by these multiple clusterings is then combined to produce an abnormality ranking of traffic flows, using a correlation-distance-based approach.
Several multi-level hybrid IDSs (MLH-IDSs) have been proposed recently to deal with the complexity of the intrusion detection problem by combining machine learning techniques. Pan et al. [24] combine neural networks and the C4.5 decision trees algorithm to detect a variety of attacks. Depren et al. [25] use a hybrid IDS consisting of an anomaly detection module, a misuse detection module and a decision support system. Zhang and Zulkernine [26] combine misuse detection and anomaly detection components using the random forests algorithm. Hwang et al. [27] propose a hybrid system combining signaturebased intrusion detection and anomaly detection to detect novel unknown attacks. Aydyn et al. [28] introduce a hybrid IDS combining anomaly-based IDS and misuse-based IDS. To further increase the intrusion detection rate, as well as to simplify the algorithm, a multi-level tree classifier is proposed in [29] .
In Table 2 , we compare several existing IDSes based on parameters such as detection type (host-based, network-based or both), detection approach (misuse, anomaly or both), nature of detection (online or offline), nature of processing (centralized or distributed), data gathering mechanism (centralized or distributed), dataset handled and approach of analysis. [58] 2000 N A N C C KDD Fuzzy logic ADAM [11] 2001 N A R C C DARPA Association rule NSOM [59] 2002 N A R C C KDD Neural nets MINDS [60] 2003 N A R C C KDD Classification FSAS [61] 2006 [57] 2011
Unsupervised NFIDS [62] 2003 N A N C C KDD Neuro fuzzy logic HIDE [63] 2001 [64] 2002 H A R C C csh Clustering N@G [65] 2003 Hy B R C C KDD Statistical ADWICE [12] 2005 N A R C C KDD Clustering DNIDS [66] 2007
Outlier-based LOF [67] 2000 N A N C C NHL Density-based Fuzzy approach [68] 2003 N A N C C KDD Kernel function RELOADED [69] 2005 N A N C C KDD Distance-based LDBSCAN [70] 2008 N A N C C KDD Clustering
Multi-level Xiang et al. approach [29] 2004 N B N C C KDD Decision tree Depren et al. approach [25] 2005 N B N C C KDD Decision tree & neural nets Zhang et al. approach [26] 2006 N B N C C KDD Random forest Hwang et al. approach [27] 2007 N B N C C KDD Signature-based Hui Lu et al. approach [55] 2009 N A N C C KDD Decision tree * H, host; N, network; Hy, hybrid; M, misuse; A, anomaly; B, both; R, realtime; N, non-realtime; C, centralised; D, distributed; KDD-KDD Cup 1999 dataset; DARPA-DARPA 1998/1999 dataset; csh-csh history file mechanism [71] ; NHL-NHL96 dataset [72] . 
OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
In this section, we formulate the problem we set out to solve in this paper. We follow it by a description of the general framework of our IDS.
Problem formulation
The performance of an individual classifier is not equally good for classification of all categories of attack as well as normal instances. There is a possibility of obtaining good classification accuracy for all categories in a dataset by using an appropriate combination of multiple well-performing classifiers. The problem can be formulated as given below. For a given set of classifiers C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C N and for a dataset D with p classes of instances, the objective of an MLH-IDS is to provide the best classification performance based on the effective use of those classifiers C i that have been identified by experiments to give the best performance for a subset of classes, with reference to a set of training instances.
The objective of such a combination is to provide the best performance from the participating classifiers for each of the classes.
Proposed framework
In this paper, we present an MLH-IDS that is capable of detecting network attacks with a high degree of accuracy. The implementation of MLH-IDS uses three levels of attack detection: a supervised method, an unsupervised method and an outlier-based method.
The selection of supervised or unsupervised or outlier-based classifier at a particular level for a given dataset is based on the classification accuracy of the individual classifier for a given dataset. The overall structure of the multi-level hybrid classifier we develop is shown in Fig. 1 . The first level of classification categorizes the test data into three categories DoS, Probe and Rest (unclassified). U2R and R2L, and the Normal connections are classified as Rest at this stage. This supervised algorithm is discussed in detail in Section 4. The main purpose at level 1 is to extract as many U2R, R2L and Normal connections as possible accurately from the data using a supervised classifier model. This is because U2R and R2L are generally quite similar to normal connections. DoS and Probe attack connections on the other hand are generally more different. The second level splits Rest into Normal and Rest categories. At level 2, the Rest category is classified as Normal and Rest (i.e. class containing attacks) using an unsupervised classifier model. The unsupervised classifier used in the second level is discussed in Section 5. The third level separates Rest into U2R and R2L. The U2R category data are extracted from Rest using the outlier-based classifier model and the remaining elements in the Rest category are classified as R2L. The outlierbased classifier is discussed in Section 6. In high-dimensional data, feature selection using mutual information (MI) is a widely accepted approach. In level 3, MI-based relevant features [30] of U2R are used in the model to classify the U2R category attacks. Other than U2R category records, the remaining items are classified as R2L category attacks.
SUPERVISED CLASSIFICATION
Our classification technique creates a set of representative clusters from the available labeled training objects. Unlabeled test objects are then inserted in these representative clusters based on similarity calculation and thus they get labels of the clusters in which they are inserted. The clustering algorithm we use is a modification of the algorithm presented by the authors in [8] . The notations used in the algorithm are given in Table 3 .
Let the dataset to be clustered contain n objects, each described by
The j th component of object X is x j and it takes one of the possible values defined in domain D j of attribute A j . Referring to each object by its serial number, the dataset can be represented by the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Similarly, the attributes are represented by the set M = {1, 2, . . . , d}.
The similarity between two data objects X and Y is the sum of per attribute similarity for all the attributes. It is computed as where s(x j , y j ) is the similarity for the j th attribute defined as
where δ j is the similarity threshold for the j th attribute. For categorical attributes δ j = 0 and for numeric attributes δ j ≥ 0. We use a subspace-based incremental clustering technique. A cluster is a set of objects that are similar over a subset of attributes only. The minimum size of the subset of attributes required to form a cluster is defined by the threshold MinAtt. Let the subset of defining attributes be represented by Dattributes = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a noAttributes } such that Dattributes ⊆ M and noAttributes is the size of Dattributes. A cluster is represented by its profile. Our profile representation is similar to that of an object. All objects in a cluster are similar with respect to the profile. The cluster profile is defined by a set of values, Values = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v noAttributes } taken over the corresponding attributes in Dattributes, that is v 1 ∈ D a 1 is the value for attribute a 1 ∈ M, v 2 ∈ D a 2 is the value for attribute a 2 ∈ M and so on. Thus, the cluster profile is defined by
Let Olist ⊆ N be the list of data objects in the cluster. A cluster C is completely defined by its Profile and Olist:
The subspace-based incremental clustering algorithm inserts an object in any one of the set of clusters existing at a particular 
moment. So the similarity between a cluster and a data object needs to be computed. Obviously, the cluster profile is used for computing this similarity. As the similarity needs to be computed over the set of attributes in Dattributes only, the similarity function between a cluster C and an object X becomes
where
To obtain appropriate values for δ j and δ a j , the following two tasks are performed.
(i) Preprocessing of the dataset using logarithm to the base 2 normalization [31] to remove bias. We discretize continuous-valued attributes by taking logarithm to the base 2 and then converting to integer. This is done for each attribute value z using the computation: if (z > 2)z = (log 2 (z)) + 1. Before taking the logarithm, the attributes that take fractional values in the range [0, 1] are multiplied by 100 so that they take values in the range [0, 100]. (ii) Use of a heuristic method to identify appropriate range for δ j and δ a j by exhaustive experiments using benchmark and real-life datasets.
A discussion on the selection of the appropriate threshold value for δ j in Equation (2) and δ a j in Equation (6) is given in Section 8.3.
Example 1. Consider a small dataset shown in Table 4 with seven objects defined over five attributes A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 and A 5 . The domains for the attributes are, respectively,
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Clusters C 1 and C 2 can be identified in the dataset with MinAtt = 3 and δ a j = 0 for a j ∈ Dattributes:
The CatSub+ algorithm
Our algorithm, which is an enhanced version of the CatSub algorithm [8] , is named CatSub+. Unlike the CatSub algorithm, we minimize the dependency on input parameters by providing the probable range of parameter values based on a heuristic method. Further, CatSub+ is cost effective, since it works on subset of relevant features selected using an informationtheoretic method [32] . CatSub+ starts with an initially empty set of clusters. It reads each object X i sequentially, inserts it in an existing cluster based upon the similarity between X i and the clusters, or a new cluster is created with X i if it is not similar enough, as defined by the threshold MinAtt, to be inserted in any one of the existing clusters. Search for a cluster for inserting the present object is started at the last cluster created and moves toward the first cluster until the search is successful. If successful, the object is inserted in the cluster found and the search is terminated. At the time of inserting the object in the found cluster C, the values of the defining attributes of the cluster (C.noAttributes) are set according to the computed similarity measure between the cluster and the object. The sets of C.Dattributes along with C.Values are also updated. If the search is not successful, a new cluster is created and the object itself made the representative object of the cluster, i.e. the full set of attributes becomes Dattributes while the full set of values of the object becomes corresponding Values of the new cluster profile. Initially, CatSub+ is trained with a fixed number of known clusters. Once the clusters and corresponding profiles are built for the known classes, newer instances are incrementally inserted in any one of the clusters.
Before the initiation of cluster formation and respective profile building, all the unselected objects are marked as unprocessed. Similarity thresholds minAtt and minSize are assigned high values and they are gradually decreased in steps. In each iteration, the remaining unprocessed objects are clustered using the similarity measure, with reference to δ. If it fails to insert an object in any of the preexisting known clusters (created in the previous iteration), then a new cluster is created with the object. When the clustering process ends in the present iteration, cluster profiles are extracted from each of the clusters having at least minSize objects in it and the objects in such a cluster are marked as processed. All insignificant clusters, whose sizes are less than minSize, are deleted. The remaining new clusters become known clusters for the next iteration after making them empty by deleting their object lists. Then the threshold values minSize and minAtt are reduced so that the next iteration can create larger clusters instead of fragmented clusters. By reducing the thresholds, more generalization is allowed. The algorithm iterates so long as there are unprocessed objects remaining. To ensure termination of the algorithm, minSize is reduced to minSize/2 so that the ultimate value of minSize becomes 1, after which no objects will remain unprocessed. The threshold minAtt is loosened by setting minAtt = minAtt − α, where α is a small integral constant such as 1 or 2. Reduction of minAtt below a certain level (MIN) is not allowed. It remains constant at MIN. Generalization beyond the MI N level will make data objects belonging to two different classes indistinguishable. When the clustering process terminates, the set of profiles found in the profile file becomes the final cluster profiles for use in the prediction process.
CatSub+ differs from CatSub in the following ways:
(i) It minimizes the dependency on input parameters by providing the probable range of δ j and δ aj based on a heuristic method. (ii) It works on a subset of relevant features selected based on an information-theoretic method [32] .
The training algorithm is given as Algorithm 1. The algorithm for prediction is given as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Similarity computation and update functions of CatSub+ 1: Function sim (cluster C, object X) 2: count = 0; 3: k = C.noAttributes; 4: for (j = 0; j < k; j = j + 1) do
end if 9: end for 10: return count; for (j = 0; j < k; j = j + 1) do 8: read(file1, C[i].a[j ]); 9: for (j = 0; j < k; j = j + 1) do 10: read(file1,
if count == C[j ].noAttributes then 12: print("Object" i " is of category" 13: clusterLabel[j ]); 14: found = 1; break; 15: else 16: if count > max then 17: max = count; position = j ; 18: end if 19: end if 20: end for 21: if found == 0 then 22: print("Object" i "is of category"; 23: clusterLabel[position]); 24: end if 25: end for 26: end for
Complexity analysis
The clustering algorithm requires one pass through the set of training examples that currently remain unprocessed. Each training example needs to be compared with existing clusters one after another until it gets inserted in one of the clusters. The similarity computation involves a subset of attributes. Therefore, the clustering process has a complexity O(ncd), where n is the number of training examples, c is the number of clusters and d is the number of attributes. Each of the created clusters needs to be visited to extract its size and profile. Hence, maximum time complexity of one iteration of the training algorithm becomes O(ncd) + O(c). The algorithm performs at most k iterations, where k = log 2 (minSize). As minSize is the minimum number of objects for a cluster to be considered significant, it is not large. The overall maximum time complexity of the algorithm is O(kncd) + O(kc).
UNSUPERVISED CLASSIFICATION
The unsupervised classification method uses the k-point algorithm [9] to create a set of representative clusters from the available unlabeled objects in the data. Initially, the method considers k objects randomly from the dataset. The data objects 
are then gathered around these selected points (or objects) based on similarities considering various attributes. The clusters are formed using two similarity measures: (i) similarity between two objects and (ii) similarity between a cluster and an object. The description of notations used in the algorithm is given in Table 3 .
Example 2. Consider a sample dataset shown in Table 5 with 10 objects defined over 6 attributes A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 , A 5 and A 6 . The domains for the attributes are, respectively,
Clusters C 1 , C 2 , C 3 and C 4 can be identified in the dataset with MinAtt = 6/2 = 3
The k-point algorithm
The unsupervised classification algorithm starts with an empty set of clusters. Initially, k objects are selected randomly from the dataset. It reads each object X i sequentially from the dataset and inserts it in an existing cluster based upon the similarity between X i and a cluster. If the similarity between a cluster and the object is below a threshold, a new cluster is created with X i , if X i is similar with any of the randomly selected k objects for a defined threshold MinmAtt of attributes. The search for a cluster for inserting an object starts from the beginning of the created cluster set until the search is successful. The objects that
The Computer Journal, 2013 Create a cluster C j with Clusprofile = (N attrib , D attrib , V attrib ); 20: Include C j to S; 21: Go to step 5; 22: else 23: T = T − 1; 24: end if 25: if T > MinmAtt then 26: Go to step 17; 27: else 28: Go to step 5; 29: end if 30: if Number of clusters in S > 2 then 31: if Profiles of C x == Profile of C y then 32: Merge Oblist of C y with Oblist of C x ; 33: Update S; 34: end if 35 : end if 36: Find the largest cluster C L by comparing Oblist of clusters from S; 37: Stop; 
Complexity analysis
The k-point algorithm requires one pass through the dataset. Each object needs to be compared with existing clusters one after another until it gets inserted in one of the clusters. The similarity computation involves a subset of attributes. Therefore, the clustering process has a complexity O(ncd), where n is the number of objects in the dataset, c is the number of clusters and d is the number of attributes. Each of the created clusters needs to be visited for k number of objects for d attributes. Hence, the maximum time complexity of k-point algorithm becomes O(ncd) + O(kd).
Cluster labeling technique
We analyze the stability of the clusters obtained using the k-point algorithm. We propose an ensemble-based stability analysis technique based on the Dunn index (Dunn) [33] , Cindex (C) [34] , Davies Bouldin's index (DB) [35] , Silhouette index (S) [36] and Xie-Beni index (XB) [37] for cluster validity (shown in Fig. 2 ). The criteria used for labeling the cluster stability analysis are given in Table 6 . Cluster results are passed to a function to compute all the indices for each of the clusters C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C k , and if the obtained value is within the acceptable range, then the cluster index, CI i is stored as 1; otherwise it is assigned 0, as defined below.
CI i = 1, jth index value, I j is within its valid range, 0, otherwise.
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OUTLIER MINING
We have developed an outlier mining method based on symmetric neighborhood relationships [39] . For each object of the dataset, a forward neighbor outlier factor is estimated by finding the nearest neighbor set and the forward nearest neighbor set of the data objects to identify outliers. The description of notation used in the algorithm is given in Table 7 .
In the dataset D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n } of n objects, let d i and d j be two arbitrary objects in D. We use Euclidean distance to evaluate the distance between objects d i and d j , denoted as dist (d i , d j ). 
Definition 1. The Nearest Neighbor Set of k objects for an object p (NNk(p)) is the set of k nearest neighbor objects of
p where k > 0. In dataset D of |D| objects, |NNk(p)| = k (i) if ∀p ∈ NNk(p) and (ii) dist(o, p) < dist(ó, p)
arbitrary objects, FNNk(p) is defined as
A score for each object of the dataset is computed based on |NNk| and |FNNk| of the object. The score is termed Forward Neighbor Outlier Factor of k objects (FNOFk) and it decides the strength of linkage of the object with other objects.
Definition 3. The Forward Neighbor Outlier Factor of k objects for an object p is the ratio of the remaining number of objects of FNNk(p) of the dataset D (except object p) to the number of dataset objects (except object p), denoted as FNOFk(p). In dataset D of objects |D|, FNOFk(p) is defined as
Example 3. A sample 2D dataset is plotted in Fig. 3 . The dataset has six objects p, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 and q 5 . For neighborhood size k = 3, the NNk and FNNk will be as follows:
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The number of objects of NNk and FNNk for k = 3 are as follows:
The outlier factor F NOF k for k = 3 and |D|=6 are as follows: 
GBBK algorithm
The outlier detection algorithm named the GBBK algorithm consists of two functions: getFNOFk(D, k) and getNNk(D, p, k) (reported as Algorithm 4). The function getFNOFk(D, k) computes the distances among all objects using Euclidean distance, sorts all distances and searches for the shortest k distances. The function getNNk(D, p, k) searches for forward nearest neighbor objects for each of k objects returned by the function getFNOFk(D, k) for any object and computes a score using Equation (9).
Complexity analysis
The outlier detection algorithm comprises two functions: getNNk() and getFNOF(). The complexity of function getNNk() is due to the distance computation among n objects and sorting of n object distances using Quicksort. So, it is n log n. Thus, the time complexity of this function is O(n + n log n). Again, the complexity of the function getFNOF() is due to search among n × k objects, computation of the outlier factor for n objects and search of n objects using a user-defined threshold value. Thus, the time complexity of this function is O(n × k × (n + n log n) + 2n). Hence, the time complexity of the outlier algorithm is O(n × k × (n + n log n) + 2n) ∼ = O(n 2 ). However, the use of spatial index structure [40] reduces the complexity significantly. 
Algorithm 4 GBBK algorithm
MLH-IDS: COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The multi-level hybrid intrusion detection method (MLH-IDS) is composed of three individual methods we have already discussed in this paper. The time complexities of each method are (i) O(ncd) + O(c) for CatSub+ (reported in Section 4.2), (ii) O(ncd) for k-point (reported in Section 5.2) and (iii) O(n 2 ) for the outlier-based method (reported in Section 6.2). The time complexity of MLH-IDS is the summarization of these three methods.
Lemma 1. The performance of MLH-IDS in terms of detection accuracy cannot be less than the performance of the individual classifiers used.
Proof. Let the MLH-IDS be called S for our current discussion. Thus, S is comprised of m classifiers C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C m , which are placed at level 1, level 2,…, level m, respectively. Also, let p < p i , where p is the performance of S and p i is the performance of classifier C i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m). As per strategy (as reported in Section 3), C i is placed at a level k (k = 1, 2, . . . , m) for detection of certain class(es) for which its performance is the best among the m classifiers and performance of S is the performance of the classifiers C i used at that level. In
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we report a comprehensive experimental evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the MLH-IDS method. All necessary experiments were carried out on an Intel workstation with Intel core 2 Quad @2.4GHz, 2 GB RAM, 160GB HDD. The programs were developed in C in a Linux environment. The method was evaluated with our real-time TUIDS [41] intrusion dataset, a DDoS Dataset, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [42] and the new version of KDD (NSL-KDD) dataset [43] .
Datasets
The description of the four datasets is given next.
TUIDS intrusion dataset
The MLH-IDS method was evaluated using our own real-life TUIDS intrusion dataset. A summary of the dataset is given in Tables 8 and 9 . The TUIDS dataset actually includes two datasets-Packet Level and Flow Level. The network traffic for attack and normal was captured using our local network within a 4-week period. The attacks were generated using attack tools [44] against a local network server and the produced traffic was collected as known attack traffic. Sixteen different types of attacks were generated. The attacks along with the corresponding tools for their generation are given in Table 10 . The network traffic was captured at packet level and flow level through two separate port-mirroring machines. The captured data were preprocessed and filtered to extract various types of features. The setup of the testbed for network flow capture included one router, one L3 switch, two L2 switches, one server, two workstations and forty nodes. A number of (six) virtual local area networks (VLANs) were created from the L3 switch and the L2 switch and nodes and workstations were connected to separated VLANs. The L3 switch was connected to a router through an internal IP router and the router was connected to the Internet through an external IP router. The server was connected to the L3 switch through the mirror port to observe the traffic activity to the switch. Another local area network (LAN) of 350 nodes was connected to other VLANs through five L3 and L2 switches and three routers. The attacks were launched within our testbed as well as from another LAN through the Internet. In launching attacks within the testbed, nodes of one VLAN were attacked from nodes of another VLAN and also the same VLAN. Normal traffic was created within our testbed under restricted conditions after disconnecting another LAN. The traffic activities to our testbed were observed in the computer connected to the mirror port. A diagram of the testbed for generation of real-life intrusion datasets is shown in Fig. 4 . The packet level network traffic was captured using the open source software tool called gulp [45] . The packets were analyzed using the open source packet analyzing software wireshark [46] . The raw packet data were preprocessed and filtered before extracting and constructing new features. In packet level network traffic, 50 types of features were extracted. The list of features are given in Table 11 . The extracted features are classified into four groups: (i) basic, (ii) content-based, (iii) time-based and (iv) connection-based.
The network flow is a unidirectional sequence of packets passing through an observation point in the network during a certain time interval between source and destination hosts. All traffic belonging to a particular flow has a set of common properties. The NetFlow protocol (IPFIX standard) [47, 48] provides a summarization of information about the router or switch traffic. We used the NetFlow version 5 protocol [49] to export flow records and used nfdump [50] to receive flow records. The extracted flow-level features are reported in Table 12 . The extracted features are of 24 types and are classified into three groups: (i) basic, (ii) time-window-based and (iii) connection-based.
DDoS dataset
The MLH-IDS method was evaluated with a DDoS Dataset we generated as well. Table 13 . The experimental testbed shown in Fig. 4 was used for generation of DDoS attacks and normal network traffic. Attacks were generated from one VLAN to another by spoofing a node of one intermediate VLAN using attack tools [44] . The network traffic was captured during a period of three weeks. We used the NetFlow version 5 protocol to export flow records and used nfdump to receive flow records. The extracted DDoS Dataset features are given in Table 14 .
KDD Cup 1999 dataset
The MLH-IDS method was also tested on datasets available in the KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection benchmark datasets [42] . Each record of the datasets represents a connection between two network hosts according to network protocols and is described by 41 attributes (38 continuous or discrete numerical attributes and 3 categorical attributes). Each record is labeled as either normal or one specific kind of attack. Each dataset contains 22 types of attacks. The attacks fall in one of the four categories: U 2R, R2L, DoS and Probe. The number of samples of each category of attack in the Corrected KDD dataset and the 10% KDD dataset are shown in Table 15 .
NSL-KDD datasets
NSL-KDD is a network-based intrusion dataset [43] . It is a filtered version of KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection benchmark dataset. In the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, there are a huge number of redundant records, which can cause the learning algorithms to be biased toward the frequent records. To solve this issue, one copy of each record was kept in the NSL-KDD dataset. Statistical characteristics of the two datasets of NSL-KDD: (i) KDDTrain + and (ii) KDDTest + are shown in Table 16 .
Data preprocessing
We discretized the continuous valued attributes by taking logarithm to the base 2 and then converting to integer as described in Section 4. Nominal valued attributes are mapped to discrete numerical codes which are nothing but serial numbers (beginning with zero) of unique attribute values in the order in which they appear in the dataset. The class label attribute is removed from the dataset and stored separately in a different file. The class labels are used for training and evaluating the detection performance of the algorithm.
δ selection
We have analyzed the effect of selection of δ j in Equation (2) and δ a j in Equation (6) 
Experimental results
Experiments were performed using four datasets, viz., (i) Realtime TUIDS intrusion dataset, (ii) DDoS Dataset, (iii) KDD Cup 1999 dataset and (iv) NSL-KDD dataset were used to evaluate the performance of our method.
Results with TUIDS intrusion dataset A. Packet Level dataset:
The confusion matrix for all-attacks categories on the Packet Level dataset is shown in Table 17 . For cross-evaluation of the Packet Level dataset, Packet Level data is used for training and Packet Level+ data is used for testing. The Packet Level+ dataset has new attack records that do not exist in Packet Level dataset and these are marked as Unknown in our experiment. In cross-evaluation, training is carried out with training data and testing is performed with the test data. Cross-evaluation results are given in Table 18 . In this case, a majority of Unknown attacks is misclassified as DoS and Normal. The average execution time of classification using cross-validation is 0.64 min.
B. Flow Level dataset:
The confusion matrix for all-attacks categories in the Flow Level datasets is shown in 
Results using the DDoS dataset
The confusion matrix for all-attacks categories on the DDoS is shown in Table 21 . The DDoS+ dataset has new attack records that do not exist in the DDoS dataset and these are marked as Unknown in experiment. In cross evaluation, training is carried out with training data and testing is performed with the test data. Cross evaluation results are given in Table 22 . In this case, a majority of Unknown attacks is misclassified as DoS and Normal. The average execution time of classification using cross evaluation is 0.21 min.
Results using KDD Cup 1999 dataset
The confusion matrices for KDD Cup 1999 dataset on the Corrected KDD and the 10% KDD datasets are shown in Tables 23 and 24 , respectively. Cross-validation results are given in Table 25 . In cross validation, the 10-percent KDD 
Results on NSL-KDD dataset
The confusion matrices for the NSL-KDD dataset using the KDDTrain + and the KDDTest + are shown in Tables 26 and  27 , respectively. For cross-validation, the KDDTrain + dataset is 
Comparison of results
We performed experiments using the TUIDS datasets, viz., the Packet level, and Flow level and DDoS datasets using the decision tree-based algorithm C4.5 [51] and a graph-based
Bayesian Networks algorithm following [52] and the Naive Bayes algorithm [53] with Weka [54] . The results of comparison of performance using these algorithms and our method are given in Tables 29 and 30 , respectively, for the TUIDS datasets at the Packet level and the Flow level. Experimental results of comparison using the above-mentioned algorithms and our method for the DDoS dataset are given in [51, [55] [56] [57] for KDD Cup 1999 intrusion datasets is given in Table 32 . As seen in Table 32 , MLH-IDS outperforms all other methods for DoS, Probe and R2L categories. In case of U2R category attack, except the method reported in [55] , MLH-IDS outperforms all other methods. Work is underway to improve the performance of the k-point algorithm with cluster stability analysis for more accurate identification of normal instances.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The work presented in this paper proposes a multi-level hybrid intrusion detection method based on supervised, unsupervised and outlier methods. The proposed method exhibits very good performance in detecting rare category attacks as well as large-scale attacks of both new and existing attacks when tested with several benchmark and real-life intrusion datasets. In further studies, we will strive to create a more effective ensemble approach based on faster and efficient classifiers so as to make a significant contribution in the study of the intrusion detection.
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